The global securitisation of youth by Sukarieh, M & Tannock, SA
 1 
The Global Securitization of Youth  
 
Mayssoun Sukarieh  
Department of Middle Eastern Studies, King’s College London 
Virginia Woolf Building, 22 Kingsway, London Wc2B 6LE 
Mayssoun.sukarieh@kcl.ac.uk 
 
Stuart Tannock 
UCL Institute of Education, University College London 
20 Bedford Way, London WC1H 0AL 
s.tannock@ucl.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article looks critically at the new global youth, peace and security agenda, that has 
been marked by the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 in 
December 2015. It argues that this agenda needs to be situated within the broader context 
of the securitization of development, and that the increasing interest in youth as a security 
subject and actor is shaped by three overlapping sets of global security concerns: the 
concept of the youth bulge is a euphemism for the problem of growing surplus populations 
worldwide; the ideal of youth as peacebuilders is a model for eliciting youth support for the 
current global social and economic order; and the spectre of globally networked youth 
being radicalised by extremist groups has legitimated joint state and private sector projects 
that are taking an increasingly active role intervening in the online lives of young people 
around the world. The article draws on an analysis of a collection of core documents that 
form the heart of the global youth and security agenda; and it argues for the need for 
greater critical reflexivity in considering the growing attention being paid to youth as a 
social category in global development and policy discourse. 
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The Global Securitization of Youth  
 
Introduction 
‘The role of youth lies at the heart of international peace and security,’ former UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has claimed, ‘We have to encourage young people to take 
up the causes of peace, diversity and mutual respect.’1 Ban’s comments were made in April 
2015 at a United Nations Security Council session on the role of youth in countering violent 
extremism. In December 2015, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2250 on Youth, 
Peace and Security, the first time the Security Council had directly addressed the central 
role of youth in global security concerns.2 Resolution 2250 was part of a set of international 
policies and conferences developed recently on youth and security, including: the White 
House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in February 2015; the European Youth 
Against Violent Extremism conference in June 2015; the Global Forum on Youth, Peace and 
Security in August 2015; the Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism in September 
2015; and the Arab Human Development Report 2016, focusing exclusively on the role of 
youth in the Arab region. All of these are closely networked and mutually referential. From 
these meetings and documents, a future set of action programmes, research agendas and 
funding streams are promised, that target global youth as central subjects and actors for 
international peace and security. 
 In some respects, none of this activity is particularly new. From its origins, youth as a 
social category has been linked with security concerns. With the rise of industrial capitalism, 
the ‘youth problem’ emerged in nineteenth century Europe and North America in the 
context of elite concerns with managing the threat to social order seen to be posed by ‘idle’ 
and unsupervised young people in growing industrial cities.3 Ever since, there have been 
 3 
recurrent moral panics over the social threat of youths, teenagers and adolescents in cities 
and nations across the globe.4 Youth have been subject to security controls through youth 
curfews, criminalization of youth activity, surveillance of youth in public spaces, use of high 
tech security measures and police presence in schools and so forth. However, the recent 
proliferation of international activity on youth and security also represents an important 
shift. Supporters of this new agenda claim this shift involves a new positive embrace of 
youth. Resolution 2250 is said to be a ‘milestone,’ ‘breakthrough,’ ‘paradigm shift’ and 
‘historic Resolution’ for recognizing ‘the positive role’ that ‘young men and women play for 
building sustainable peace,’ rather than viewing youth primarily as security victims or 
threats.5 But such arguments do not hold up to scrutiny, as recent documents on global 
youth and security are saturated with concerns with youth as threat and liability. Youth has 
always had a double-sided aspect, such that for every stereotypical representation of youth 
as problem and pathology there exists an inverse idealisation of youth as possibility and 
panacea. ‘Youth as a sign of contradiction, as the figuration of a mythic bipolarity,’ note Jean 
and John Comaroff, ‘is enshrined in the foundations of the modern collective imaginary’.6  
 In this paper, we argue that the shift that has occurred in the current period is the 
transition of youth from being primarily a local and national to a global security concern. 
Though there have been precedents – in the 1960s, for example, the US Central Intelligence 
Agency raised the alarm over the global spread of a rebellious university student movement 
– this is largely a new development.7 It has occurred through a double movement that has 
accelerated from the 1990s onward: on the one hand, the social category of youth has 
become an increasing concern for international development policy and discourse, in part 
due to its utility for the neoliberal project of renegotiating and eroding welfare and 
development state entitlements;8 and on the other, development policy and discourse has 
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become ever more closely tied to global security concerns, following the end of the Cold 
War and rise of the ‘war on terror’.9 In this context, global youth has become an important 
frame for articulating and acting on elite anxieties about three overlapping sets of security 
concerns. First, the concept of a ‘youth bulge’ has been used as a politically acceptable 
euphemism for talking about the problem of expanding surplus populations in the post-
welfare and development state era. Second, the ideal of ‘youth as peacebuilders’ has joined 
other ideal roles of youth (as active citizens, change agents and entrepreneurs) as 
ideological models for interpellating young people into supporting the contemporary global 
economic order.10 Third, a moral panic over the spectre of ‘globally networked youth’ being 
radicalized and recruited by terrorists has legitimated the spread of close partnerships 
between the state and private sector not just to monitor and control social media and 
internet technology, but to recruit youth to help create and disseminate online messages of 
peace, security and defence of the global status quo.  
 In the following pages, we develop our argument based on an analysis of a set of 
core documents that comprise the heart of the global youth, peace and security agenda. We 
identified this set of documents by following intertextual references in Resolution 2250 and 
its supporting documentation to preceding events and texts identified as central to the 
development of the global youth and security agenda; and searching online for subsequent 
events and texts that directly position themselves as taking up Resolution 2250’s agenda. 
We further draw in this article on a review of academic literature on securitization, counter-
extremism, peacebuilding and critical youth studies. 
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The securitization of development 
 The global securitization of youth has occurred in the context of the securitization of 
development and rise of a ‘security-development nexus’. Development, like youth, has been 
linked to security agendas from its origins.11 However, scholars argue that there have been a 
series of shifts in the relationship between the two concepts and fields of practice since the 
1990s, that involves the increasing prominence of security rhetorics, actors and institutions 
within national and international development programs. The concept of securitization is 
defined as ‘the process of presenting an issue in security terms, in other words as an 
existential threat’;12 while the idea of a security-development nexus refers to a political 
environment in which security concerns and development challenges are claimed to be 
‘inextricably linked’ and an extensive ‘network of connections’ is constructed to join up 
security and development policies, practices, actors and institutions.13 The effectiveness of 
prioritising security concerns throughout all arenas of social life, or linking up development 
and security agendas, is not necessarily based on research evidence; and the safety and 
well-being of individuals and communities may not actually be improved by the ubiquitous 
promotion of security concerns. Rather, security in the current period has taken on a value 
in itself, such that its invocation ‘sets up a framework where any external regulatory or 
interventionist initiative can be talked up … as being of vital importance’.14  
 As security agendas have been extended across fields of social practice, the concept 
of security has been broadened to an all encompassing notion of ‘human security’ – defined 
by the United Nations as a concern with political, social, environmental, economic, military 
and cultural ‘threats and situations’ that block ‘human freedoms and human fulfillment,’ 
including ‘chronic and persistent poverty, … climate change, health pandemics, … and 
sudden economic and financial downturns’.15 In such a context, the concept of security can 
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be applied to any social issue; it also means there has been increasing interest, in the name 
of security, in the perpetual monitoring, managing and training of individuals and 
populations. This is reinforced by a third trend: security has been globalised, in the sense 
that the security of states and populations in the global North are said to be threatened by 
development and security failures in the rest of the world, and dependent on ‘security and 
development policy interventions in regions previously lacking geostrategic importance’.16 
Underdevelopment in peripheral regions of the global economy is thus reconstrued not just 
as a development problem for those living in these regions, but a security concern for those 
living in metropolitan centres of global wealth accumulation. This logic is what leads the US 
State Department to invest in local youth engagement and leadership programs throughout 
Africa and the Middle East, in the name of supporting national security interests of averting 
terrorist attacks on Americans at home and overseas.17 
 
Youth bulges and surplus populations 
 The most important way in which global youth have become linked to global security 
concerns is through the concept of the youth bulge: the idea that there is in many countries 
of the global South a disproportionate and unprecedented number of young people, and 
this demographic imbalance can lead to escalated conflict, violence and political unrest if 
not addressed effectively. Most of the youth, peace and security documents refer to the 
concept of the youth bulge. Resolution 2250 begins by noting that ‘today’s generation of 
youth is the largest the world has ever known,’ and ‘young people often form the majority 
of the populations in countries affected by armed conflict’.18 The Declaration on Youth, 
Peace and Security opens by claiming that the largest generation of youth in history makes it 
a ‘demographic imperative’ to include youth in global security agendas.19 The Arab Human 
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Development Report 2016 explains its focus on youth by pointing to the ‘unprecedented’ 
demographic ‘wave,’ ‘mass’ and ‘momentum’ in the Arab world caused by the fact that 
‘young people between the ages of fifteen and 29 make up nearly a third of the region’s 
population, [while] another third are below the age of fifteen’.20  
 While youth bulge theory has existed for decades, it took off in the 1990s, promoted 
by individuals working with the US security establishment to explain ‘political instability in 
the Arab world and … recruitment to international terrorist networks’;21 invoked not only to 
explain the rise of violent Islamic fundamentalism, the theory has also been used to account 
for the outbreak of the Arab Spring uprisings and overthrow of authoritarian regimes in the 
Middle East region in 2011.22 More broadly, the US National Intelligence Council has warned 
of a demographic ‘arc of instability’ of ‘countries with youthful age structures and rapidly 
growing populations [that] form a crescent stretching from the Andean region of Latin 
America across Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus, and then through the 
northern parts of South Asia’.23 Given this recent history of youth bulge theory, it is thus not 
incidental that there has been a strong Middle East basis for the development of the recent 
global youth and security agenda: Resolution 2250 was introduced by Jordan during its 
membership of the UN Security Council in 2015; the Global Forum on Youth, Peace and 
Security in August 2015 that worked to build support for the passage of Resolution 2250 
was held in Amman under the patronage of Crown Prince Hussein; and the first of a global 
series of regional consultations to promote the progress of Resolution 2250 was also held in 
Amman and focused on the ‘Arab States Region’.24 As with other states in the Middle East 
(and their western backers), the government of Jordan has been particularly concerned with 
security threats posed by the youth bulge. ‘In recent years, we came to a challenge unlike 
any before’, King Abdullah II has written: ‘Jordan entered the 21st century with a large youth 
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population, young men and women who have the same high expectations as their peers 
across the world’.25 
 Youth bulge discourse is the direct successor to claims in previous eras that framed 
the problem of ‘overpopulation’ in the global South as a threat to US national security, and 
population control in these regions as an essential development priority for protecting US 
security interests. The difference is that, in the context of the Cold War, US foreign policy 
leaders worried that growing populations in low income countries would create economic 
and political instability and foster the spread of communism rather than, as is the case 
today, Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.26 Youth bulge theory has been criticised for 
drawing on stereotypical and unfounded claims about youth, and particularly, male youth of 
colour in the global South.27 Early versions of the theory made strongly deterministic 
arguments, by claiming that there are threshold tipping points in society, so that when the 
proportion of the population aged 15-24 is higher than 20%, civil unrest and political 
violence will ensue.28 Youth, and young men especially, are said by youth bulge theorists to 
be more inclined to violence and conflict than other age groups, since they are allegedly 
‘highly idealistic, sensitive to peer approval, prone to risk taking, and naively accepting of 
ideological explanations’.29 Not only are such claims widely challenged in the youth studies 
literature;30 but also, despite youth bulge theory being used to explain outbreaks of political 
violence in regions like Africa, ‘most African nations with youth bulge populations have not 
experienced recent civil conflicts, and in those that have had conflicts, most male youth 
never get involved with the violence’.31  
 While such criticisms are important, youth bulge theory today is not specifically 
about youth in and of itself. First, there is variation in how the youth bulge is defined: 
Resolution 2250 is notable for its ‘old’ definition of youth, as it excludes all individuals under 
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the age of 18 and defines youth as ‘persons of the age of 18-29 years old’.32 Youth bulge 
theorists in general not only use a range of ages for defining youth (15-24, 15-29, 17-26 
etc.), but typically consider this group in relation to the adult working population, not the 
population as a whole.33 The ‘youth bulge’ thus is often used as shorthand to refer to 
youthful, expanding populations more generally, and can include everyone under the age of 
30, including infants and young children – as can be seen in the Arab Human Development 
Report 2016’s concern, noted above, with a youthful demographic ‘momentum’ in the 
contemporary Arab world. In media, policy and academic discussions, there is frequently a 
slippage between the idea of a youth bulge and a youthful age structure in a country’s 
population.34 Second, the significance of the youth bulge today is typically spoken of in 
relation to the problem of lack of economic opportunity. In the Declaration on Youth, Peace 
and Security, it is not large populations of youth that lead to unrest and violence, but the 
failure to provide youth with social and economic opportunity: 
Around the world we, young people, are disproportionately affected by limited access to social 
and economic opportunities. Limited or inadequate employment opportunities … can contribute 
to economic isolation, political disillusionment and social unrest.35 
It is in the context of economic stagnation and decline, most youth bulge theorists now 
argue, that youth bulges (or youthful age structures) can lead to social unrest and political 
conflict, not necessarily due to innate characteristics of the young, but to competition over 
limited resources and opportunities.36 Indeed, in other contexts, large youthful populations 
‘may even be a boon to the economy’ and ‘can actually enhance economic growth, if the 
youth can be absorbed into new jobs’.37 
 What the youth bulge concept is effectively talking about, then, is the problem of 
surplus populations in the current post-welfare and development state period. One of the 
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core features of global neoliberal capitalism is the growth in numbers of people who are 
‘rendered as structurally unnecessary to a capital-intensive economy,’ who ‘cease being of 
value as workers and consumers,’ and are ‘expelled from the core social and economic 
orders of our time’.38 This has been variously discussed by scholars as ‘human waste’39, 
‘advanced marginality’,40 ‘wageless life’41 and ‘expulsions’.42 This shift in capitalist society 
toward the growing production of surplus populations is often explained as a product of 
technological displacement of labour from capitalist production, shift of capital into sectors 
with limited labour requirements, globalisation of capitalism leading to the displacement 
and dispossession of people who previously enjoyed alternative livelihoods, and neoliberal 
rollback of the development and welfare state model of seeking full if unequal social and 
economic inclusion.43  
The concept of the youth bulge provides elites with a politically legitimate way of 
talking about the problem of surplus populations, for it shifts attention from contradictions 
internal to global capitalist society to apparently external challenges that are created by the 
combination of high fertility rates, poor governance and limited development in countries of 
the global South. Indeed, the social category of youth worldwide, Sommers suggests, is 
increasingly identified as an ‘outcast majority’ and defined as ‘a young person with a 
tenuous social status and a hoped-for social transformation into adulthood … [w]hich may 
not happen.’44 In the global South, especially, youth is described by many researchers as a 
period of ‘waithood,’ as many young people are ‘blocked from realizing … models of 
successful adulthood [and] are forced to subsist in a prolonged state of dependency, 
boredom, frustration, unemployment and underemployment’.45 Once we recognise the 
youth bulge can be used as a frame for articulating concerns about surplus populations, it is 
easier to understand one of the paradoxes of contemporary global youth development 
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policy: despite the ostensible concern with youth exclusion and unemployment, there is 
little evidence of any shift away from the neoliberal development model that has been 
linked to producing such exclusion and unemployment, nor of any new mass employment 
programs that might be expected to effectively address these problems.46 The aim of the 
post-welfare, post-development security state is not ‘the incorporation of all social classes 
into the State,’ but ‘the management of social fragmentation and the ‘advanced marginality’ 
of a growing global surplus population rendered ‘structurally irrelevant’ to capital 
accumulation’.47 The concern, in other words, is what to do about ‘massive surpluses of 
potentially restive redundant populations’ that global elites fear pose a genuine security 
threat to ‘continued capital accumulation and social cohesion,’ locally and nationally, and at 
the global level as well.48  
 
Youth, counter-extremism and peacebuilding 
 The overriding concern in the global youth, peace and security agenda is that youth, 
and particularly surplus populations of youth excluded from economic opportunity, are at 
risk of being radicalised and pulled into violent (and other) forms of extremism. Resolution 
2250 warns that ‘the rise of radicalization to violence and violent extremism, especially 
among youth, threatens stability and development’.49 The Youth Action Agenda to Prevent 
Violent Extremism claims that ‘the appeal of violent extremism is growing around the 
world,’ and ‘a sense of disengagement and marginalization, despite the inter-connected 
world we live in, leaves young people vulnerable to recruitment wherever they are’.50 The 
Arab Human Development Report 2016 argues that ‘violent radicalization has become a 
particular concern – indeed, a defining feature – across the Arab region, particularly among 
youth’.51 The Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security in Amman, though recognising 
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that ‘the vast majority of young people have nothing at all to do with violence,’ argues that 
‘nonetheless, global patterns and growing incidence of violence, extremism and instability 
challenge the world community’ to respond effectively to ‘demographic … imperatives to 
offer meaningful avenues for young people to shape the future of their countries’.52 The 
immediate trigger for this concern, as Williams observes, is ‘a background of ever-younger 
recruits to the … Islamic State of Iraq and Syria … and other groups in conflict zones and 
more stable countries further afield’.53 
 The principal response to the threat of youth radicalization and extremism in these 
reports and conferences is to seek to engage youth directly as ‘peacebuilders’ themselves, 
doing counter-extremism and anti-radicalization work at the local, national and global level. 
In this, the youth, peace and security agenda fits with trends in the broader securitization of 
development: for it argues that traditional state responses to youth radicalization often 
tackle only ‘the symptoms of the problem rather than addressing the factors driving 
participation in violent extremism,’ and can ‘further aggravate tensions and trigger more 
support for violent ideologies;’ there is thus a need for a more expansive and participatory 
approach that engages youth ‘as key allies in building resilience against violent 
extremism’.54 There is now an expanding set of ‘guiding principles,’ ‘pillars of action,’ ‘action 
agendas,’ ‘key action points’ and implementation ‘steps’ for fostering youth peacebuilding 
around the world.55 The purpose of all of these is to get youth to embrace a ‘culture of 
peace, tolerance [and] dialogue’ and vision of a ‘peaceful global society,’ and to reinforce 
the endlessly repeated mantra that ‘there is no development without peace, and there is no 
peace without development’.56  
 All of this can sound appealing, and is a reason why the youth, peace and security 
agenda is celebrated by supporters as a turning point that fosters a positive view of youth in 
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global society. It is likely this agenda can open up space for valuable youth peacebuilding 
work. Nevertheless, it is vital to take a critical look at what exactly is being said and done in 
the name of this new ‘youth as peacebuilder’ discourse. Three points, in particular, stand 
out. First, the youth, peace and security agenda adopts an essentialist view of peace as self-
evidently and unproblematically desirable, with violence and conflict unquestionably bad 
and undesirable. Statements about seeking the commitment of global youth to a ‘culture of 
peace’ are made without qualification. The problem with this approach is that it: 
disregards that some conflicts may be necessary such as … when social groups are struggling for 
equality and social justice…. [W]hat constitutes ‘conflict’ or ‘peace’ as well as their evaluative 
imprint poses critical questions concerning who decides which conflict may be productive and 
which is destructive and with what criteria….[S]ome groups in conflict-affected societies might 
strongly believe that before ‘justice’ exists, they cannot consider peace.57  
While demands for a youthful commitment to peace may be found throughout the key 
global youth, peace and security documents, it is notable that there is limited attention paid 
to the question of social justice. There is no discussion of how the significance of peace and 
conflict may be contested in local contexts; nor is there an attempt to ‘distinguish between 
productive and destructive forms of conflict’.58 The Arab Human Development Report 2016, 
for example, fails to clearly differentiate between the conflicts of the Arab Spring uprisings 
that challenged authoritarian regimes across the Arab region in 2011, and the conflicts of 
the elite-led counter-revolution that ensued. Instead, the report blurs these together, holds 
youth responsible, and calls for interventions to prevent such outbreaks of conflict 
happening again: 
[Y]oung populations are more prone to engage in conflict than older ones…. For this reason, this 
Report examines the problems and challenges of youth in light of the recent [Arab Spring] 
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uprisings…. Since 2011, several countries in the region witnessed uprisings, and the region has 
experienced the most rapid expansion in war and violent conflict among all global regions over 
the past decade…. The exclusion of youth is pervasive throughout the Arab region … [and] 
ignited uprisings across many Arab countries in late 2010 and early 2011, causing some to 
descend into social and political instability and deep economic uncertainty.59  
In this light, the call made by the Arab Human Development Report 2016 for ‘education 
[that] will help youth appreciate the value of peace’ and ‘reorientation programmes that 
instill the value of peaceful coexistence’ in youth can be seen as problematic.60 For this call 
is based on claims that hold Arab youth more responsible than other groups for violent 
conflict in the region; it fails to address the regional and global structural violence, 
inequality and injustice that make commitments to peace impossible in current contexts; 
and it actively seeks to suppress or redirect the challenges to the political and economic 
status quo that erupted so impressively in the Arab Spring. 
 Second, the practice of youth ‘peacebuilding’ that is called for throughout the global 
youth, peace and security is left vaguely defined: for, as with the concept of human security, 
peacebuilding encompasses all arenas of social practice. The United Nations’ Guiding 
Principles on Young People’s Participation in Peacebuilding states that peacebuilding should 
involve ‘all sectors (social, economic, cultural and political) and levels (family, school, 
community, local, regional and national governance)’.61 Despite the lack of clear definition, 
the model of peacebuilding promoted by the youth, peace and security agenda has all the 
hallmarks of the liberal peacebuilding approach associated with the United Nations, World 
Bank and international development organizations since the 1990s, an approach that claims 
that ‘the surest foundation for peace … is market democracy,’ and that sees peacebuilding 
as a matter of ‘transplanting Western models of social, political and economic organization 
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into war-shattered states’ and pursuing ‘political and economic liberalization’.62 Resolution 
2250 ‘stresses the importance of creating policies for youth that … positively contribute to 
peacebuilding efforts’, in particular ‘social and economic development’ that ‘provide youth 
employment opportunities’ and promote ‘youth entrepreneurship’.63 The Declaration on 
Youth, Peace and Security likewise calls on governments to ‘prioritize youth employment 
opportunities and inclusive labour policies’, teach youth ‘skills to meet the labour demands’, 
and work with the private sector ‘as partners in youth employment and entrepreneurship 
programs’.64 While these might sound like promising ways to address youth economic 
marginalisation and exclusion, the call by international organizations in the current period 
to open up employment opportunities for the young has overwhelmingly been tied to a 
standard set of neoliberal demands for privatization, market deregulation and rollback of 
workplace protections for older workers – reforms that actually tend to harm not help the 
economic standing of youth and other workers alike.65 This link is made clear in the Arab 
Human Development Report 2016, which blames youth development problems in the Arab 
world on the large size of the public sector and calls for a shift to more private sector 
employment, as well as removal of the ‘tight restrictions’ and protections that inhibit free 
‘movement of goods, people and capital’ in the region.66 Promotion of youth employment 
has now become one of donors’ preferred peacebuilding programs in many post-conflict 
settings; but not only is there limited evidence that such programs do much to create 
sustainable and good quality jobs for young people, it is also possible that they work to 
entrench social and economic models that undermine peace and security in the first place.67  
The call to become a young peacebuilder can appear noble and utopian. As Gur 
Ze’ev notes, there is a widespread ‘conviction that peace should be sought, longed for, or 
struggled for’.68 But as Pugh insists, we always need to ask ‘who is peacebuilding for, and 
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what purposes does it serve?’.69 What many now argue is that the liberal peacebuilding 
model that has prevailed for the past decades does not push for the radical redistribution of 
political and economic power that could effectively address the marginalisation of youthful 
surplus populations: it instead deploys the uplifting rhetoric of peace and peacebuilding to 
build and maintain ideological support for a neoliberal global order that remains massively 
unequal, and protects and serves the interests of national and global elites in the first 
instance.70 When young people are asked to become ‘peacebuilders,’ we need to consider 
carefully the exact nature of the peace they are being asked to help build, and whether this 
‘peace’ supports or contests ‘the fortification of the existing order and the preservation of 
the invisibility of hegemonic violence’.71  
The third key issue that needs to be addressed in the global youth as peacebuilders 
discourse is the link between peacebuilding and the call for interventions to prevent the 
spread of youth radicalization and extremism. As with peace and peacebuilding, these terms 
are vaguely defined: Resolution 2250 contains fourteen mentions of these two terms in five 
pages of text but fails to provide a definition for either; the Youth Action Agenda to Prevent 
Violent Extremism and Promote Peace has a whopping twenty eight mentions of the word 
‘extremism’ in four pages of text but again does not define its meaning, except to say its 
appeal is ‘growing’ and the ‘gravity’ of its threat is severe.72 When governments and 
international organizations do define these terms, they tend to do so in sweeping ways that 
refer to any individual or group that seeks to mount a serious and direct challenge to their 
own agendas, whether through violent or other means.73 The Arab Human Development 
Report 2016, for example, defines radicalization as: 
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a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, 
or religious ideas or aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or prevailing ideas, 
expressions, or institutions … [that] can be violent or nonviolent’.74  
Radicalization and violent extremism, moreover, are terms that only apply to opponents of 
western states and international organizations: US drone strikes that kill civilians around the 
world, or IMF structural adjustment programs that severely undermine public well-being 
can never be examples of violent extremism, while the terrorist attacks that might respond 
to such actions and programmes inevitably are. 
The youth, peace and security agenda draws directly on the field of theory, policy 
and practice on anti-radicalization and counter-extremism that has been constructed over 
the past two decades in the context of the global war on terror. As such, it is subject to the 
same critiques that have been made of this field more generally.75 Rather than acknowledge 
the legitimacy of the grievances that may underlie terrorist acts of violence, anti-
radicalisation and counter-extremism theory assume that such acts are rooted in the 
psychology, ideology and identity of extremist individuals and groups. Consequently, the 
response is typically to increase surveillance and intervention in the lives of those youth 
deemed ‘at risk’ of extremism, in order to identify and counter the ideas, dispositions, 
relationships, ideologies and cultures believed responsible for triggering terrorist violence. 
The favored solution is to put youth through preventative or restorative educational 
programmes in which they can be taught to value and embrace the ‘prevailing ideas, 
expressions, or institutions’ of their home societies. The Youth Action Agenda to Prevent 
Violent Extremism thus calls for the production, sharing and amplification of ‘new 
narratives’, ‘new stories about peace and positive role models’, and ‘a future without 
violence’.76 The Arab Human Development Report 2016 calls on religious leaders, 
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governments, civil society groups, educators, artists and media producers to collaborate in 
order to ‘build and communicate a message of moderation’ that provide a ‘counter 
narrative’ to the ‘insidious ideologies that underpin violent extremism’.77 Almost inevitably, 
anti-radicalisation and counter-extremism work has led to the stereotyping and targeting of 
ethnic and faith based (particularly Muslim) communities, as well as individuals with views 
and practices that are strongly critical of the mainstream political, economic and social 
order. In the domains of formal and nonformal education, anti-radicalisation and counter-
extremism policies and programmes have been criticised for their repressive impact on the 
freedom of thought and expression, and contravention of basic tenets of a healthy public, 
democratic and critical model of teaching and learning. Rather than teach students, for 
example, to ‘train their critical and analytic lens on the states and societies that shape their 
lives,’ something that might be said to be ‘’the best safeguard against dogmatism and 
acceptance of authoritarianism’ that democratic education can be expected to provide,’ 
instead ‘the anti-radicalization movement asks educators to work hand in glove with the 
state security apparatus to train their analytical lens on students themselves’.78  
 
Globally networked youth 
The global youth, peace and security agenda has further been motivated by the rise 
of a moral panic over terrorist groups using the internet and social media to radicalise and 
recruit young people worldwide.79 The internet, US President Obama warned, ‘erases the 
distance between countries’ and enables extremists to enter into the bedrooms of youth to 
‘poison their minds’.80 Resolution 2250 expresses ‘concern over the increased use … by 
terrorists and their supporters of new information and communication technologies, in 
particular the Internet, for purposes of recruitment and incitement of youth to commit 
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terrorist acts’.81 The Global Youth Issues Special Advisor for the US State Department warns 
of ‘the Islamic State’s knack for glamorizing terrorist life through social media’, such as 
‘tweeting photos of ‘a stack of fluffy pancakes with syrup dripping down’ to draw in young 
men’.82 The UN Special Envoy on Youth notes that ‘there are almost 50,000 Twitter accounts 
with ISIS affiliates – almost 90,000 tweets every day being sent by ISIS supporters,’ and 
insists ‘we have to win the battle online and offline by engaging young people’.83  
 Initial responses to global fears of online youth radicalization focused on increased 
social media and internet monitoring and censorship. Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and other 
internet companies have shut down sites and accounts suspected of extremist links: Twitter 
alone had reportedly closed over 235,000 accounts ‘linked to ISIS and other extremist 
organizations’ by August 2016.84 However, such acts of disruption have been seen as 
ineffective and inefficient (not to mention at risk of violation of free speech rights), and 
global security actors have subsequently moved toward directly involving youth in 
producing counter-messages and alternative narratives online, as a new form of youth 
peacebuilding work.85 Counter-narratives entail ‘efforts to deconstruct, discredit and 
demystify violent extremist messaging, whether through ideology, logic, fact or humour;’ 
while alternative narratives seek to ‘unite the silent majority against extremism by 
emphasising solidarity, common causes and shared values’.86 The Global Youth Summit 
Against Violent Extremism launched the One95 counter-narrative program, described as ‘an 
online networking, education and funding hub’ that ‘connects global youth working to 
combat extremism in their respective communities’.87 The Global Forum on Youth, Peace 
and Security created a ‘youth4peace’ website, storify page and Twitter hashtag, as well as 
the ‘I Declare’ campaign, ‘in which youth posted on social media phrases beginning with ‘I 
Declare’, followed by an issue relevant to youth, peace and security.88 These are part of a 
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growing multitude of online youth counter-extremism programs. The US State Department 
runs a Peer 2 Peer: Challenging Extremism public-private partnership that sponsors 
university students globally to ‘use their creativity, digital proficiency and expertise on their 
community peers to identify how best to motivate and encourage youth to become involved 
in countering extremism’.89 The UK-based Institute for Strategic Dialogue runs worldwide 
Youth Innovation Labs, that ‘connect youth activists with local artists, creatives and tech-
sector experts’, in order to ‘facilitate the creation of counter-narrative campaigns and 
initiatives that challenge or provide alternatives to the ideologies, narratives and 
propaganda of violent extremists’.90 The principle of all of these programs is that young 
people themselves ‘are in the best position to reach and educate their peers about the 
impact of violent extremism’.91  
 As is the case with all moral panics, supporting evidence for claims both of the threat 
of online radicalization and effectiveness of online counter-extremism efforts is limited. Not 
only is the concept of radicalization problematic, there is little to suggest it happens online 
only on any regular basis – despite fearmongering rhetoric about ‘isolated individuals tied to 
their computers in an echo chamber for which reality and other influences are often kept at 
bay’.92 The literature on online radicalization is plagued with problematic stereotypes of 
youth vulnerability and passivity that misrecognise how young people engage actively with 
communication technology.93 Not only are online counter-extremism efforts of questionable 
effectiveness, they also pose a number of concerning developments.94 For the challenge of 
launching effective online counter-extremism programs has led governments to work in 
close coordination with the private sector to better manipulate both young people and 
information on the internet and social media. Counter-extremism groups working with the 
US Department of Homeland Security have thus sought guidance from marketing companies 
 21 
‘that have devoted considerable resources to understanding youth, their changing interests, 
behaviors, preferences, and needs’, including ‘the management and marketers of an 
internationally-renowned teen music group that has achieved its multi-billion dollar 
popularity almost solely through the Internet’.95 Google, Microsoft, Facebook and Twitter 
have all worked with governments on online counter-extremism programs that recruit 
youth to act as ‘credible messengers’ for delivering the messages the state has decided it 
wants delivered.96 Google has also set up a ‘diversion’ program, so that when an internet 
‘user searches for certain terms or topics, their requests are diverted to nongovernmental 
organization … sites where countermessaging occurs’.97 Ironically, despite arguments by 
counter extremism experts for the need to promote critical digital or media and information 
literacy among youth in order for them to better analyse the information they encounter on 
the internet and social media, much current online counter extremism work seems to seek 
to deliberately obscure, manipulate, mislead and control the nature and sources of 
information online. 
 
Conclusion 
 Invocations of youth as world changers – or peacebuilders in this case – can be 
deeply appealing; for young people who find themselves so often shut out of opportunities 
to lead or even participate, elite invitations to take a direct role in global security matters 
can seem like a major step forward. But if we are to understand the larger and longer term 
significance of the current global youth, peace and security agenda, we need to take a close 
and critical look at each of the core terms this agenda promotes. Who exactly are the youth 
the agenda is talking about, and why are global youth becoming the focus of elite attention 
now? What is the nature of the peace and security that youth are being asked to embrace 
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and promote, and what exactly is expected to be done in the name of youth peacebuilding 
worldwide? We need to ask what are the practical consequences of this agenda in terms of 
changes in education, employment, welfare and justice laws, policies and programs that 
directly impact the lives of young people and their families globally. We need to question, 
too, what are the roles and interests of the multinational corporations and international 
organisations that are playing a direct and growing role in shaping security discourses and 
practices surrounding young people in their online and offline lives? 
 The central argument that we put forward here is that to understand and, most 
importantly, to be be able to develop alternatives to the current global youth, peace and 
security agenda, we need to focus on what is left unsaid and unaddressed in this agenda. 
We need to consider the phenomenon of expanding surplus populations worldwide, and the 
contradictions of global neoliberal capitalism that have led these populations to grow. 
Rather than seek to include youth within and secure youth commitment to current social 
and economic institutions, we need to address and work to radically transform the 
fundamental injustices and inequalities of these institutions. Alongside seeking to more 
closely observe and guide the ideas and actions of marginalised young people around the 
world, we need also to turn our critical, analytic gaze to monitor and contest the ideas and 
actions of current political and economic elites. Former United Nations Secretary-General 
Ban Ki Moon, in a recent Security Council debate on the role of global youth in countering 
violent extremism, issued a ‘call for deploying ‘weapons of mass instruction’ to foster a 
culture of peace’ among youth globally, and insisted that ‘this is more than a clever slogan – 
it is an effective strategy’.98 There is a distinct risk that, is the absence of careful and 
sustained critique of the global youth, peace and security agenda that Ban and others have 
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been promoting, the violence and attack invoked in this ‘effective strategy’ is going to end 
up being directed at global youth themselves. 
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